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Note 
 
Tortured Language: “Individuals,” Corporate 
Liability, and the Torture Victim Protection Act 
Brad Emmons 
In late May of 1998, a group of approximately 120 Ilaje 
youths boarded the Parabe oil platform, a site operated by  
Chevron Nigeria Ltd., to protest the oil company‘s destruction 
of their surrounding community.1 This ―Concerned Ilaje Citi-
zens‖ group,2 like other Ilaje tribespeople living in the swamp-
land region of Ondo State, Nigeria,3 had for years helplessly 
witnessed the destruction of their fishing grounds and water 
supplies due to Chevron‘s dredging activities and numerous oil 
spills.4 On May 25, weeks after Chevron refused to meet with 
members of their community, the exasperated Ilaje youths 
went to the Parabe platform and refused to leave until Chevron 
provided compensation for the environmental damage.5 Un-
daunted, Chevron reported the occupation to the federal and 
state law enforcement agencies, and on May 28, the company 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School. The author 
would like to give special thanks to University of Minnesota Law School Pro-
fessors Jennifer Green and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin for their invaluable assistance 
in understanding the various arguments and policy concerns associated with 
the topic of corporate liability under the Torture Victim Protection Act. To the 
extent that this Note accurately describes these arguments and concerns, 
much of that credit goes to them; any mistakes are, of course, my own. Many 
thanks also to Laura Arneson, Jennifer Gover Bannon, and the hard-working 
editors and staff members of the Minnesota Law Review for their advice and 
efforts. Copyright © 2011 by Brad Emmons. 
 1. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPON-
SIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA‘S OIL PRODUCING COM-
MUNITIES 135 (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/ 
nigeria0199.pdf.  
 2. Id. 
 3. See EARTHRIGHTS INT‘L & CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, FIRST 
THEY POISONED OUR LAND: WHEN WE PROTESTED, THEY SHOT US 2 (2006), 
available at http://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Chevron 
-first-they-poisoned-our-land.pdf. 
 4. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1.  
 5. See id. at 135–36. 
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flew members of the nation‘s navy and Mobile Police to the 
platform.6 Upon arriving, these security forces opened fire on 
the protesters, killing two youths.7 Later, they allegedly tor-
tured the group‘s captured leader.8 
Twelve years later, this bloody labor conflict in Nigeria had 
transformed into a legal conflict in the United States. Because 
a suit in Nigerian courts against Chevron and the government 
actors was almost certain to fail,9 the surviving victims and 
their families turned to U.S. courts for help.10 With the 1992 
passage of the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),11 the 
United States had expressed its intent to provide an avenue for 
the pursuit of civil damages for certain acts of torture or extra-
judicial killing committed by ―[a]n individual . . . under actual 
or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign na-
tion . . . .‖12 Yet since the Act‘s passage, district courts had dis-
agreed vociferously over whether a corporation could be liable 
as ―[a]n individual‖ under the TVPA.13 Although in 2005 the 
Eleventh Circuit had held that a tort action could be brought 
against corporations under the TVPA,14 the Ninth Circuit held 
otherwise when it considered the Ilaje survivors‘ claims.15 On 
September 10, 2010, the latter court found that Chevron could 
not be held liable for the attack on the Ilaje youths in Ondo 
State, concluding that corporations could not be considered ―in-
dividuals‖ for TVPA purposes.16 That ruling created a circuit 
split on the issue—and threatened to derail future efforts to 
hold corporations liable for torture or extrajudicial killings.17 
 
 6. See id. at 137. 
 7. See id.  
 8. See id. 
 9. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991) (―Judicial protection against fla-
grant human rights violations is often least effective in those countries where 
such abuses are most prevalent. A state that practices torture and summary 
execution is not one that adheres to the rule of law.‖). 
 10. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2008), aff ’d, 
621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 11. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
note (2006)). 
 12. Id. § 2(a). 
 13. See infra notes 75–84 and accompanying text. 
 14. See Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1247, 
1250–53 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding an action under the TVPA and the Alien 
Tort Statute could be sustained against a corporation). 
 15. See Bowoto, 621 F.3d at 1126–28. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Indeed, two appellate courts have recently adopted the Ninth Circuit‘s 
rationale to reach the same conclusion. See Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., No. 10-1908, 
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On one hand, might the Ninth Circuit‘s decision be techni-
cally correct? ―Individuals‖ are usually seen as distinct from 
corporations in federal law18—and yet are not always so.19 The 
legislative history directly preceding the TVPA hints that the 
choice of language had nothing to do with the issue of corporate 
liability20—and yet a committee hearing on the TVPA in an 
earlier Congress clearly indicates the opposite.21 The tradition-
al methods of statutory interpretation do not easily resolve the 
TVPA‘s ambiguities. 
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit‘s holding raises 
troubling concerns about the prospects of relief for victims of 
corporate-sponsored torture. In the past decade, a large num-
ber of well-known corporations have come under legal scrutiny 
for engaging in human rights abuses in dozens of countries in 
Asia, Africa, and South America.22 Yet recent appellate opi-
nions have prohibited tort claims for torture under any statute 
other than the TVPA23 and have protected corporations from 
civil actions under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),24 the TVPA‘s 
statutory cousin,25 for such ―violation[s] of the law of nations.‖26 
 
2011 WL 4349356, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 19, 2011) (dismissing a claim against a 
chemical manufacturer under the TVPA on grounds that the manufacturer 
was no subject to suit under the TVPA); Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604, 
607–09 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the TVPA does not create a cause of ac-
tion against an organization), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 
2011) (No. 11-88). 
 18. See, e.g., Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (emphasis added) (defin-
ing ―person‖ under most federal laws as including ―corporations . . . as well as 
individuals‖). 
 19. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 & n.13 (1998) (holding 
that the term ―individual‖ can be synonymous with ―person‖ and can therefore 
refer to corporate entities). 
 20. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3–5 (1991) (failing to address possible cor-
porate liability under the TVPA). 
 21. See The Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 1417 Before 
the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong. 87–88 (1988) (statements of Rep. 
Jim Leach, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, and Doug Bellis, Legis. Counsel). 
 22. See Elliot J. Schrage, Judging Corporate Accountability in the Global 
Economy, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 153, 160 (2003). 
 23. See, e.g., Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 884–85 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(finding that the TVPA ―occup[ies] the field‖ with regard to civil claims seek-
ing redress for torture). 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 25. The TVPA is nestled in the historical notes of the Alien Tort Statute. 
See id. § 1350 note. 
 26. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(finding that the ATS does not serve as a jurisdictional basis for suits against 
corporations since ―the law of nations‖ has not historically embraced corporate 
liability), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491). 
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Now the Supreme Court is set to consider the question of orga-
nizational liability under the TVPA in Mohamad v. Rajoub,27 
but a holding that preserves Congress‘s anti-torture intentions 
is not guaranteed. 
Consequently, despite the seriousness of the plague of cor-
porate-sponsored torture under the color of State law, possible 
avenues of relief for torture victims are being blocked in juris-
diction after jurisdiction. Because corporations will otherwise 
have no economic disincentive to discourage torture and extra-
judicial killings, the need to preserve an avenue that provides 
for civil liability for these crimes is especially vital. This Note 
argues that while the language of the TVPA is ambiguous and 
open to opposing, yet equally valid, interpretations, strong poli-
cy interests weigh in favor of recognizing corporate liability for 
violations of the Act‘s provisions. Part I of this Note discusses 
the history of the TVPA and the ATS and corporate liability 
under each. Part II examines the unclear nature of the TVPA‘s 
statutory language and accompanying legislative history as 
well as the policy implications weighing in favor of corporate 
liability under the TVPA. Part III embraces these policy inter-
ests, calls for the Supreme Court to recognize organizational 
liability under the Act, yet reserves the possibility that Con-
gress may also step in to modify the statute‘s language if neces-
sary. Specifically, this Note argues that although the TVPA 
does not clearly support or foreclose liability for corporations 
engaged in human rights abuses, the nation‘s policy interests 
in eliminating torture and providing redress for its victims are 
best supported by judicial recognition of such liability. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE TVPA AND ITS NEXUS WITH 
THE ATS   
Though this Note focuses on the TVPA, the history of that 
Act and the question of corporate liability under it are intert-
wined with the history of the ATS.28 After briefly reviewing the 
 
Contra Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding 
that corporations can be liable for violations of international law under the 
ATS). 
 27. See Mohamad v. Rajoub, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 
11-88) (granting certiorari); 11-88 Mohamad v. Rajoub, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-00088qp.pdf ( last visited Nov. 6, 2011) 
(presenting the question on appeal as ―[w]hether the Torture Victim Protec-
tion Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a), permits actions against defendants 
which are not natural persons‖). 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
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history of human rights litigation under the ATS, this Section 
will discuss the passage of the TVPA, the express language of 
that Act, the emerging question of TVPA actions against corpo-
rate defendants, and the potential limitations placed on such 
suits by recent developments in TVPA and ATS jurisprudence. 
A. EARLY HISTORY OF THE ATS 
The modern era of human rights litigation in U.S. courts 
began with the rediscovery of the Alien Tort Statute, which has 
a short but notable pedigree for a statute that dates to the 
founding of the republic.29 First passed as part of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789,30 the ATS states in full: ―The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a trea-
ty of the United States.‖31 No legislative history exists to shed 
any light on Congress‘s intentions for the statute.32  
Virtually forgotten after its passage, the ATS was only in-
voked successfully twice in federal courts in the first 190 years 
that followed.33 However, the statute received fresh attention 
following the Second Circuit‘s 1980 decision in Filartiga v. Pe-
na-Irala.34 In that case, a Paraguayan woman residing in 
Washington, D.C., brought a wrongful-death suit against 
another Paraguayan citizen who, the woman alleged, tortured 
her brother to death while working as a police official in Asun-
 
 29. See generally, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The History, Nature, and Reach of 
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 FLA. J. INT‘L L. 249 (2004) (providing a brief 
overview of the statute and its history); Jordan D. Shephard, Note, When Sosa 
Meets Iqbal: Plausibility Pleading in Human Rights Litigation, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 2318 (2011) (same). 
 30. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). 
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 32. See Luis Enrique Cuervo, The Alien Tort Statute, Corporate Accounta-
bility, and the New Lex Petrolea, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 151, 163 (2006) (noting 
that the legislative history of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was not recorded). One 
suggestion is that the ATS was adopted on the premise that ―upholding the 
law of nations was an obligation of nationhood.‖ See BETH STEPHENS ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 4 (2d ed. 2008). 
 33. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863–65 (D. Md. 1961) (finding jurisdic-
tion under the statute for a child custody suit between aliens); Bolchos v. Dar-
rel, 3 Fed. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607) (finding an alternative basis 
for jurisdiction for a maritime property dispute brought by a French citizen). 
Adra suggests that six earlier cases and an attorney general‘s opinion also dis-
cussed but dismissed the possibility of jurisdiction under the ATS. See 195 F. 
Supp. at 863 & n.5 (citing Khedivial Line v. Seafarers‘ Int‘l Union, 278 F.2d 
49, 52 (1960)). 
 34. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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cion, Paraguay.35 Noting the universal condemnation of torture 
among the governments of the world,36 the circuit court held 
that the ATS provided sufficient jurisdiction for the suit.37 Even 
though the ATS had rarely been invoked to provide jurisdiction, 
the court concluded, the Paraguayan decedent had clearly met 
the statute‘s requirements.38 
Although suits for human rights violations under the ATS 
―significantly increased‖ following the Filartiga decision,39 not 
every federal judge was in complete agreement with its holding. 
Just four years later, the D.C. Circuit Court issued a per cu-
riam opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, affirming a 
lower court‘s dismissal of a wrongful-death suit brought by 
Israeli citizens against various Palestinian groups and suppor-
ters following an armed attack on an Israeli bus.40 In a concur-
ring opinion, Judge Robert Bork attacked the use of the ATS as 
a basis for suits such as the one before his court, arguing that 
separation-of-powers concerns weighed against finding a cause 
of action where doing so could interfere with international af-
fairs, a field typically left to the ―political branches.‖41 Although 
the other concurring judges distanced themselves from this 
reasoning,42 Judge Bork‘s opinion nonetheless presented the 
first serious judicial challenge to the use of the ATS to pursue 
redress against those responsible for torture and extrajudicial 
killings. 
Thus, after almost two centuries of dormancy, a paradigm 
for using the ATS to redress human rights violations emerged 
among the circuit courts in the 1980s. However, opinions such 
 
 35. Id. at 878. 
 36. Id. at 883 (―Turning to the act of torture, we have little difficulty dis-
cerning its universal renunciation in the modern usage and practice of na-
tions.‖ (citation omitted)); see also id. at 890 (―[F]or purposes of civil liability, 
the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis 
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.‖). 
 37. Id. at 880–85. 
 38. Id. at 887. 
 39. See Paust, supra note 29, at 250–52. ―Approximately 150 lawsuits had 
been filed under the statute as of late 2006 . . . .‖ STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 
32, at 12. 
 40. 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 
 41. See id. at 804–05 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 42. See id. at 777 (Edwards, J., concurring) (supporting dismissal despite 
agreeing that the ATS provides jurisdiction for cases adjudicating ―the rights 
already recognized by international law‖); id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring) 
(supporting dismissal solely on political question grounds). 
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as Judge Bork‘s in Tel-Oren raised legitimate concerns that this 
paradigm was not sustainable. 
B. CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS 
While natural persons remained the focus of ATS case law 
in the first seventeen years that followed Filartiga, such litiga-
tion soon shifted to focus primarily on corporate defendants. 
Through the mid-1990s, most cases brought under the ATS re-
sembled Filartiga and Tel-Oren in that the alleged wrongful ac-
tor was a natural person acting as an agent of a foreign state.43 
This trend changed with the 1997 decision in Doe v. Unocal 
Corp.,44 where the Central District of California determined 
that multinational corporations working in tandem with for-
eign governments could be liable for tort action under the 
ATS.45 This decision ―opened the floodgates in this arena, so 
much so that in recent times, ATS jurisprudence has been dom-
inated by cases alleging . . . abuses by multinational corpora-
tions operating in the developing world.‖46 
However, the feasibility of ATS actions against corpora-
tions has been drawn into question by a series of appellate 
court holdings in recent years. Like all ATS litigation after 
2004, such suits were most prominently affected by the U.S. 
Supreme Court‘s landmark holding in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain.47 In that decision, the Court concluded that litigants 
could rely on a modern understanding of which claims violate 
―the law of nations‖48 when bringing suits, but that such claims 
must ―rest on a norm of international character accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the 
 
 43. See Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost of Alien Tort Litigation: A 
Response to Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 1, 6 (2004). For examples of such cases, see Kadic v. Karadžić, 
70 F.3d 232, 238–45 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing ATS jurisdiction in a tort ac-
tion for genocide against the leader of a Bosnian-Serb region), and In re Estate 
of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475–76 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (recognizing ATS jurisdiction in a tort action for torture and extra-
judicial killings against the estate of the former President of the Philippines). 
 44. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 
932 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 45. See Duruigbo, supra note 43, at 7 (citing Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 880). 
 46. Id.; see also id. at 7 n.33 (contending that ―[u]p to fifty lawsuits ha[d] 
been brought against [corporations] under the ATS‖ by 2004) (citing LINDA A. 
WILLETT ET AL., NAT‘L CTR. FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, THE ALIEN TORT STA-
TUTE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (2003)). 
 47. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 48. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
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features of the 18th-century paradigms‖ already recognized as 
such violations.49 These violations included ―violation of safe 
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and pira-
cy.‖50 Although dicta, the Court conceded that Congress had re-
cently provided ―a clear mandate‖ that torture and extrajudicial 
killings be considered violations of the law of nations—in other 
words, the kind of violations covered by the ATS.51 Left unad-
dressed, however, was whether such actions also constituted 
such a violation when committed by corporate actors. 
Although the question of corporate liability under the ATS 
has since been addressed by several circuits, a consensus has 
not yet emerged. On one hand, three circuits have issued opi-
nions that either assume or expressly recognize corporate lia-
bility under the ATS.52 On the other hand, the Second Circuit 
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. recently repudiated 
such liability when expressly considering the question, finding 
that customary international law does not yet recognize corpo-
rate liability for human rights abuses.53 Although critics of the 
ATS immediately celebrated the Kiobel holding,54 the U.S. Su-
preme Court recently granted certiorari in that case,55 and it 
 
 49. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
 50. Id. at 724. 
 51. See id. at 728. 
 52. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(holding that a corporate defendant could be sued under the ATS for tortious 
medical experimentation on human subjects in Nigeria), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 3541 (2010); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 
2008) (recognizing corporate liability under the ATS as ―the law of this Cir-
cuit‖); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that a mining company could be found vicariously liable for, among other 
things, village destruction and rape in Papua New Guinea). 
 53. 621 F.3d 111, 131–45 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 
(U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491). Notably, ―the Second Circuit had routinely 
considered ATS suits against corporations and other juridical entities‖ before 
deciding against corporate liability in Kiobel. Petition for cert., Kiobel, No. 10-
1491 (80 U.S.L.W. 3237) (U.S. June 6, 2011), 2011 WL 2326721, at *19. 
 54. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Further Thoughts on Today’s Second Cir-
cuit ATS Decision on Corporate Liability, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 17, 
2010, 11:20 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/09/17/further-thoughts-on-todays-second 
-circuit-ats-decision-on-corporate-liability/ (regarding the Kiobel ruling as ―a 
blockbuster opinion‖); Julian Ku, Goodbye to the Alien Tort Statute?: Second 
Circuit Rejects Corporate Liability for Violations of Customary International 
Law, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 17, 2010, 1:10 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/17/ 
goodbye-to-ats-litigation-second-circuit-rejects-corporate-liability-for-violations 
-of-customary-international-law/ (agreeing with the perspective that ―there 
appears to be no serious argument left that customary international law can 
impose duties on private corporations‖). 
 55. Kiobel, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237. 
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remains unclear whether the Second Circuit‘s reasoning will 
prevail. 
By the early 1990s, however, the ATS was not the only 
avenue for a tort action against alleged torturers. In addition to 
bringing suit under the ATS, noncitizen plaintiffs had started 
pursuing claims under Congress‘s ―clear mandate‖ against tor-
ture—the TVPA. 
C. THE BIRTH OF THE TVPA 
The 1984 Tel-Oren decision happened to coincide with a 
renewed focus on international human rights abuses, both in 
the United States and in the world at large. That same year, 
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment was adopted by the Unit-
ed Nations.56 This instrument obligated states to implement 
measures providing protections against torture for potential 
extraditees or deportees,57 criminalizing torture and complicity 
in torture,58 and providing a jurisdictional basis for civil actions 
against torturers.59 Similarly, 1984 also heralded a series of 
hearings on torture before several House and Senate commit-
tees, followed by the passage of a joint resolution calling for 
―the enactment and vigorous implementation of laws to rein-
force the United States policies with respect to torture.‖60 
In this vein, several legislators decided to bypass Judge 
Bork‘s concerns by showing express congressional approval of 
the use of federal courts to litigate tort claims for torture and 
similar human rights abuses.61 In May 1986, Representative 
Gus Yatron introduced a bill which would have allowed suits 
against ―[e]very person who, under actual or apparent authori-
ty of any foreign nation, subjects any person to torture or extra-
 
 56. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Con-
vention Against Torture]. The U.S. Senate ratified the Convention in 1990. See 
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991). 
 57. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 56, art. 3. 
 58. Id. art. 4. 
 59. See id. art. 14. 
 60. See 133 CONG. REC. 6670 (1987) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
 61. See 134 CONG. REC. 28,613 (1988) (statement of Rep. Patrick Swin-
dall) (expressing concern that ―several recent judicial decisions have ques-
tioned whether [the ATS] provided a sufficiently clear basis‖ for such suits); 
132 CONG. REC. 12,949 (1986) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) (citing Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
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judicial killing . . . .‖62 A month later, Senator Arlen Specter in-
troduced a bill featuring similar language in the Senate.63 
Though no major action was taken on either bill, both sponsors 
continued to press for the passage of such legislation in subse-
quent Congresses. Representative Constantine Yatron had 
more success in the House; that chamber passed similar ver-
sions of the original legislation in each of the following three 
Congresses,64 at least once in overwhelming numbers.65 How-
ever, despite having the support of several prominent legal and 
human rights organizations,66 the legislation did not find suffi-
cient support in the Senate during the 100th and 101st Con-
gresses.67 Finally, with congressmen concerned about the mal-
treatment of American soldiers on the battlefield during the 
1991 Gulf War,68 both chambers of the 102nd Congress ulti-
mately passed this legislation as the Torture Victim Protection 
Act of 1991, codifying the language within the notes of the 
Alien Tort Statute.69 
D. THE LANGUAGE OF THE TVPA 
Section 2(a) of the TVPA, as passed by Congress on March 
12, 1992, defines the scope of liability covered by the Act: 
Liability.—An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or 
color of law, of any foreign nation—(1) subjects an individual to tor-
ture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or 
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil ac-
 
 62. H.R. 4756, 99th Cong. § 2 (1986). 
 63. S. 2528, 99th Cong. § 2 (1986). 
 64. See 138 CONG. REC. 4178 (1992) (noting passage of H.R. 2092, 102d 
Cong. (1991)); 135 CONG. REC. 22,986 (1989) (noting passage of H.R. 1662, 
101st Cong. (1989)); 134 CONG. REC. 28,860 (1988) (noting passage of H.R. 
1417, 100th Cong. (1987)). 
 65. See 137 CONG. REC. 2671 (1991) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) 
(noting passage of H.R. 1417 by a vote of 362 to 4). 
 66. See 134 CONG. REC. 28,613 (statement of Rep. Patrick Swindall) (hig-
hlighting the support of the American Bar Association, Amnesty Internation-
al, and the Lawyers‘ Committee for Human Rights for the House  
legislation). 
 67. 137 CONG. REC. 2671 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter). 
 68. See id. (―Our soldiers languishing in Saddam Hussein‘s prisons have 
almost certainly been brutally tortured. This bill will give our P.O.W.‘s a cause 
of action . . . .‖). 
 69. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
note (2006)). Though the inclusion of active legislation in a statute‘s note sec-
tion may not be common, it is apparently not unheard of. See THE BLUEBOOK: 
A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 3.4, at 71 (Columbia Law Review Ass‘n et 
al. eds., 19th ed. 2010) (providing citation guidelines for material in a statute‘s 
note section). 
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tion, be liable for damages to the individual‘s legal representative, or 
to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful 
death.70 
The Act also defines ―torture‖ and ―extrajudicial killings‖71 
and requires that claimants exhaust all available remedies in 
the jurisdiction in which the actions occurred before pursuing 
action under the TVPA in the United States.72 
The legislative history accompanying the TVPA significant-
ly illuminates the factors motivating the Act‘s passage. First, 
the accompanying Senate Report notes that enactment of the 
TVPA would ―carry out the intent of the Convention Against 
Torture‖ by ―making sure that torturers and death squads will 
no longer have a safe haven in the United States.‖73 Second, the 
legislation was designed to address Judge Bork‘s insistence 
that separation-of-powers concerns required an explicit con-
gressional grant of a private right of action for lawsuits which 
may affect foreign relations.74 Finally, Congress acted with the 
intent to put the United States on par with other nations that 
were already allowing for civil suits against torture occurring 
outside of the nations‘ borders.75 
The legislative history also discusses, although incomplete-
ly, the reasoning behind the choice of language regarding which 
defendants can be sued. In the 100th Congress, the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs amended the proposed TVPA by 
changing the characterization of potential TVPA defendants 
from ―person‖ to ―individual‖ precisely to prevent corporations 
from becoming liable under the Act.76 Subsequent House bills 
continued to use that latter term,77 though their reasons for 
doing so are never explained in the accompanying legislative 
history. However, the Senate legislation preserved the use of 
the word ―person‖ to describe potential defendants until the 
102nd Congress, when Senate Bill 313 was amended in No-
 
 70. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a). 
 71. Id. note § 3. 
 72. Id. note § 2(b). The TVPA also provides a statute of limitations of ten 
years, measured from the time when the cause of action arose. Id. note § 2(c). 
 73. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991). 
 74. See id. at 4–5 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 
799, 801–08 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring)). 
 75. See id. at 5. 
 76. See Hearing on H.R. 1417, supra note 21. 
 77. See H.R. 2092, 102d Cong. § 2(a) (2d Sess. 1991) (―individual‖); H.R. 
1662, 101st Cong. § 2(a) (1st Sess. 1989) (same). 
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vember 1991 to change this term to ―individual‖ as well.78 The 
Senate Report accompanying that chamber‘s later amendments 
notes that ―[t]he legislation uses the term ‗individual‘ to make 
crystal clear that foreign states or their entities cannot be sued 
under this bill under any circumstances: only individuals may 
be sued.‖79 As far as the Senate Report is concerned, the lan-
guage was only altered to clarify that the TVPA does not over-
ride traditional protections such as foreign sovereign immunity, 
diplomatic immunity, and head-of-state immunity.80 
As explained in the legislative history accompanying the 
TVPA, the Act was designed to provide a tort remedy for indi-
viduals subjected to torture or extrajudicial killings while pre-
serving the immunities traditionally accorded to foreign sov-
ereigns. Soon, however, other potential defendants were 
seeking refuge in the language that ensured these protections. 
E. THE TVPA AND THE QUESTION OF CORPORATE LIABILITY 
Despite the legislative history discussing questions of sove-
reign immunity, district courts soon relied on the use of ―indi-
vidual‖ instead of ―person‖ in the Act to address a different con-
cern—the liability of corporations under the TVPA. For 
example, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., the first TVPA 
case to consider corporate liability, an Indonesian tribesman 
brought suit under both the ATS and the TVPA against an 
American-owned mining subsidiary operating in Indonesia, al-
leging human rights abuses that included torture and extra-
judicial killings.81 In ruling that corporations could not be held 
liable under the TVPA, the Eastern District Court of Louisiana 
expressly refused to rely on anything but the plain language of 
the statute, pursuant to Fifth Circuit precedent that mandates 
reliance on plain language unless an absurd result would follow 
from doing so.82 Thus, as ―the term ‗individual‘ does not typical-
 
 78. Compare S. 313, 102d Cong. § 2(a) (1st Sess. 1991), quoted in 137 
CONG. REC. 2671 (1991) (using ―person‖ in the original language of the bill), 
with id., quoted in S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 2 (using ―individual‖ in the 
amended version). 
 79. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7. 
 80. See id. at 7–8. For more on these immunities and their relationship 
with the TVPA and the ATS, see generally STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 32, at 
365–84. 
 81. 969 F. Supp. 362, 365–66 (E.D. La. 1997), aff ’d on other grounds, 197 
F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 82. See id. at 381–82 (citing In re Abbott Laboratories, 51 F.3d 524, 529 
(5th Cir. 1995)). 
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ly include a corporation,‖ the court reasoned that it would make 
no sense to read such a definition into the term.83 While the 
court noted the existence of legislative history discussing the 
choice of the term ―individual,‖ it ultimately held that a limited 
reading of the term was not inconsistent with that history, as 
neither the House nor the Senate had expressly considered the 
issue of corporate liability under the Act.84 On that basis, the 
court concluded that there was no reason to recognize corporate 
liability under the TVPA.85 
The next reported case that considered the question was 
brought six years later in the Southern District of Florida. In 
the context of the decades-long civil war in Colombia, union 
members accused Coca-Cola of engaging a government-
sponsored paramilitary unit to kill union organizers in Sinal-
trainal v. Coca-Cola Co.86 In contrast to the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, this court ruled that corporations meet the defini-
tion of ―individual‖ for TVPA purposes. Here, the court relied in 
part on language from Beanal regarding congressional intent, 
recognizing that ―[c]ongress does not appear to have had the in-
tent to exclude private corporations from liability under the 
TVPA.‖87 Further, the court cited the recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Clinton v. City of New York,88 a decision that 
had not been released until after Beanal, which recognized that 
―the term ‗individual‘ is synonymous with ‗person‘‖ in many 
contexts. The district court reasoned that because ―a corpora-
tion is generally viewed the same as a person in other areas of 
law, a reading of the term ―individual‖ to encompass corporate 
liability under the TVPA would be consistent with legislative 
intent.89 
In the following years, district courts continued to disagree 
over whether the TVPA subjected corporations to liability un-
 
 83. See id. at 382. 
 84. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 6; H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4 
(1991)). 
 85. See id. 
 86. 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348–50 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 87. See id. at 1358–59 (citing Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 382) (alteration in 
original). 
 88. See id. (citing Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 & n.13 
(1998)). 
 89. Sinaltrainal, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1359; see also Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. 
§ 1 (2006) (defining the words ―person‖ and ―whoever‖ in any congressional act 
to include ―corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, 
and joint stock companies‖ unless context would indicate another reading). 
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der its terms, with the majority finding no such liability.90 Still, 
no circuit court ruled on the issue until the 2005 decision in Al-
dana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc.91 In that case, the 
Eleventh Circuit considered an action by Guatemalan labor ac-
tivists against a corporate employer under both the ATS and 
the TVPA for torture and other alleged human rights viola-
tions.92 In overturning the district court‘s decision to dismiss 
the claims, the Eleventh Circuit held that some of the acts de-
scribed could constitute torture for purposes of each provision.93 
Notably, however, while concluding that the plaintiffs could 
bring the claims under either statute,94 the court did not ex-
pressly consider whether an ―individual‖ under the TVPA could 
include corporate defendants. The court realized this omission 
three years later in Romero v. Drummond Co., when consider-
ing a tort action under the TVPA by a Colombian labor organi-
zation against an American corporation‘s Colombian subsidiary 
for alleged human rights abuses.95 Still, in response to the de-
fendant‘s argument that its corporate status allowed it to es-
cape liability, the Eleventh Circuit remarked that it had impli-
citly recognized the liability of corporations in Aldana, and it 
concluded that it was ―bound by that precedent.‖96 
Thus, it appears that until 2010, the only circuit court to 
have ruled on the question of corporate liability under the 
TVPA did so accidentally.97 However, the Ninth Circuit‘s deci-
 
 90. Compare Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1026 (W.D. 
Wash. 2005) (relying on the plain language of the TVPA to conclude that ―in-
dividual‖ does not encompass corporations), and Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 28 (D.D.C. 2005) (same), rev’d in part, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1175–
76 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (same), and Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 141 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (same), with Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. 
Supp. 2d 1250, 1266–67 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (relying on Sinaltrainal and the 
TVPA‘s legislative history to conclude that corporations could be liable under 
the TVPA). 
 91. 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
 92. Id. at 1245–46. 
 93. See id. at 1250–53. 
 94. Id. 
 95. 552 F.3d 1303, 1308–09, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 96. See id. 
 97. Before the Ninth Circuit‘s Bowoto opinion, the Eleventh Circuit was 
indeed the only circuit court to have considered the question of corporate lia-
bility under the TVPA. However, the record on this question is significantly 
confused by a recent pre-Bowoto Note on this topic that claims otherwise. Emi-
ly Martin states that a ―circuit split‖ already existed between the Eleventh 
Circuit, which had held that corporations could be liable under the TVPA, and 
the Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, which she claims had held that corpora-
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sion in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp.98 represented both the first ex-
press appellate court consideration of corporate liability under 
the TVPA and a clear rejection of the Eleventh Circuit position. 
In that opinion, where the court decided the appeal of the Ilaje 
youths against Chevron,99 the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
Southern District of Florida‘s equation of ―person‖ with ―indi-
vidual‖ in Sinaltrainal, noting that Congress‘s official defini-
tion of ―person‖ refers to ―individual[s]‖ as distinct from ―corpo-
rations‖ and other entities.100 While acknowledging the 
Supreme Court‘s precedent in Clinton, which held that ―indi-
vidual‖ and ―person‖ are often used synonymously in legisla-
tion, the Ninth Circuit also observed that the holding in that 
case relied on the context of the use of the term ―individual.‖101 
In the TVPA, the court noted, the term ―individual‖ is also used 
―to refer both to the torturer and the victim of torture,‖ and it 
would be absurd to conclude that a corporate ―person‖ could be 
a torture victim.102 Finally, the court noted that the first itera-
tions of the TVPA subjected any ―person‖ to liability under the 
 
tions were not subject to TVPA liability. See Emily M. Martin, Note, Torture, 
Inc.: Corporate Liability Under the Torture Victim Protection Act, 31 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 175, 186–90 (2010). However, in each of the anti-corporate-liability 
cases cited, Martin conflates the district court opinions with each case‘s re-
spective appellate court opinion. See id. at 189 (stating that ―[t]he Fifth Circuit 
held‖ against corporate liability but citing to a district court ruling); id. (claim-
ing that ―[t]he Ninth Circuit adopted the position of the Fifth Circuit‖ but cit-
ing to another district court ruling); id. at 190 (stating again that the Ninth 
Circuit‘s position ―was upheld by the D.C. Circuit‖ but citing again to a district 
court opinion). In fact, in each of the cases cited by Martin, the circuit courts 
never ruled on the question of corporate liability under the TVPA, deciding 
each case on other grounds or giving none at all. See Mujica v. Occidental Pe-
troleum Corp., 564 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2009), remanding on other 
grounds 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Bao v. Li, 35 F. App‘x. 1, 1 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (per curiam), aff ’g without comment 201 F. Supp. 2d 14 
(D.D.C. 2000); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 
1999) (―[W]e need not reach the question of whether a cause of action for indi-
vidual human rights violations is actionable against a corporation under the 
TVPA.‖), aff ’g on other grounds 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997). When an ar-
gument has never been ―squarely addressed‖ by an appellate court, that court 
is not bound by the argument, even if its holdings may implicitly accept the 
argument. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630–31 (1993). As the 
Ninth Circuit correctly recognized, the Eleventh Circuit was ―the one Circuit 
court to mention the issue‖ prior to the Bowoto decision. See Bowoto v. Che-
vron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 98. Bowoto, 621 F.3d at 1116. 
 99. See id. at 1126–28. 
 100. See id. at 1126–27 (citing Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)). 
 101. Id. at 1127 (citing Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 
(1998)). 
 102. See id. 
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Act, but that subsequent amendments changed this term to 
―individual,‖ indicating clear congressional intent to exclude 
corporations from liability under the Act.103 Thus, rejecting the 
Eleventh Circuit ruling and embracing the majority position, 
the Ninth Circuit held that corporations cannot be held liable 
for torture or extrajudicial killings under the TVPA.104 
The Ninth Circuit‘s logic, since adopted by two other cir-
cuits,105 appears to seriously undermine future human rights 
suits against corporate defendants when combined with Kiobel 
and other cases. Under Kiobel, such claims cannot be brought 
against corporations under the ATS;106 under Bowoto, such 
claims cannot be brought against corporations under the 
TVPA.107 To add to the confusion, the appellate courts disagree 
as to whether the existence of the TVPA rules out suits against 
any actor for torture or extrajudicial killings,108 since that law‘s 
 
 103. See id. at 1127–28. 
 104. See id. at 1128. 
 105. See Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., No. 10-1908, 2011 WL 4349356, at *3–5 (4th 
Cir. Sept. 19, 2011) (relying on Bowoto‘s analysis to find that a corporation 
cannot be held liable under the TVPA); Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604, 
606–09 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (similarly relying on Bowoto to rule out liability for 
organizations under the TVPA), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 
2011) (No. 11-88). 
 106. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 131–45 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (holding that the ATS does not allow for actions against corpora-
tions), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491). In-
deed, because several circuits have concluded that the TVPA does not have a 
jurisdictional provision, the foreclosure of corporate liability under the ATS 
may have implications for some actions against corporations under the TVPA. 
See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (―Though the Tor-
ture Victim Act creates a cause of action for official torture, this statute, un-
like the Alien Tort Act, is not itself a jurisdictional statute. The Torture Victim 
Act permits the appellants to pursue their claims of official torture under the 
jurisdiction conferred by the Alien Tort Act and also under the general federal 
question jurisdiction of section 1331 . . . .‖ (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006))). 
Under this logic, if the Supreme Court rules that the ATS does not contem-
plate corporate liability, TVPA litigants may be limited to an action pursued 
under § 1331‘s federal-question jurisdiction. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(―The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.‖). 
 107. See Bowoto, 621 F.3d at 1126–28. 
 108. Compare Khulumani v. Barclay Nat‘l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 259–63 
(2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (dismissing a torture claim on other grounds under 
the TVPA while finding the claim actionable under the ATS), with Enahoro v. 
Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 884–85 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the TVPA 
―preempts‖ claims of relief for torture or extrajudicial killing that would oth-
erwise be litigated under the ATS). 
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focus might mean that the TVPA ―occup[ies] the field‖ on these 
subjects.109  
Thus the viability of torture or extrajudicial claims against 
corporate actors is threatened on three fronts—suits against 
corporate actors under the TVPA, suits against corporate actors 
under the ATS, and any suit at all for these wrongful acts un-
der the ATS. With the Supreme Court poised to consider the 
question of such suits under either the ATS110 or the TVPA,111 
victims of human rights abuses perpetrated at the behest of 
corporate entities may soon find themselves unable to seek re-
dress in U.S. courts. 
II.  THE TVPA IS AMBIGUOUS ON THE QUESTION OF 
CORPORATE LIABILITY   
By specifically establishing a basis for civil actions to re-
cover for torture or extrajudicial killings, Congress intended for 
the TVPA to strengthen the domestic prohibition against these 
crimes in a manner that allows the nation to fulfill its interna-
tional human rights obligations.112 This Part argues that while 
policy considerations weigh in favor of recognizing corporate 
liability under the TVPA, the Act‘s language and the relevant 
legislative history are ambiguous on the issue and have thus 
created confusion in the district and appellate courts. 
A. ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY 
1. Statutory Language 
As noted in Beanal, the first case to consider the question 
of corporate liability under the TVPA, courts should first turn 
to the plain language of the statute being examined when seek-
ing to interpret the provision‘s meaning.113 Under federal law, 
―individual‖ is a term that may generally be understood as dis-
tinct from the term ―corporation.‖ The Dictionary Act, the first 
 
 109. Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 884–85. 
 110. Kiobel, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237. 
 111. Mohamad v. Rajoub, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-
88). The viability of such suits against corporations under either the ATS or 
the TVPA will be considered by the Court in tandem. Id. 
 112. See Cuervo, supra note 32, at 173. 
 113. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 381–82 (E.D. La. 
1997) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240–42 
(1989)), aff ’d on other grounds, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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statute in the United States Code, provides general definitions 
for a number of terms used in federal law, applying such defini-
tions to ―any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates oth-
erwise.‖114 In that statute, Congress has defined the term ―per-
son‖ to ―include corporations, companies, associations, firms, 
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as 
individuals.‖115 According to the Ninth Circuit in Bowoto, this 
definition implies that ―corporations‖ and ―individuals‖ should 
be understood ―as distinct terms,‖ leading that court to con-
clude that ―we must therefore presume those terms have differ-
ent meanings.‖116 With this understanding, the baseline pre-
sumption is that the TVPA does not provide for corporate 
liability, as the Act only allows for tort actions against ―indi-
vidual[s].‖117 
However, courts that have recognized corporate liability 
under the TVPA have pointed out that this presumption is re-
buttable. As the Ninth Circuit itself had previously acknowl-
edged, the term ―individual‖ ―does not necessarily exclude cor-
porations.‖118 In Clinton, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
context of the word‘s usage can make ―individual‖ synonymous 
with ―person‖—the broader term that generally includes corpo-
rations—where doing otherwise would lead to ―an absurd and 
unjust result which Congress could not have intended.‖119 The 
cornerstone, then, is congressional intent—if ―Congress un-
doubtedly intended the word ‗individual‘ to be construed as 
synonymous with the word ‗person,‘‖ then the particular word 
choice should make little difference.120 
Based on its understanding of Clinton, the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida concluded in Sinaltrainal that for purposes of 
the TVPA, the terms ―individual‖ and ―person‖ were synonym-
ous.121 After all, in everyday parlance, ―corporations are gener-
ally treated as persons in other areas of law,‖ and Congress 
could have expressly excluded corporations from TVPA liability 
 
 114. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 115. Id. (emphasis added). 
 116. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 117. 28 U.S.C. 1350 note § 2(a) (2006). 
 118. United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 119. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) (quoting Griffin 
v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 574 (1982)). 
 120. Id. at 428. 
 121. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1358–59 (S.D. 
Fla. 2003). 
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if it had preferred to do so.122 Indeed, there are many examples 
in federal law where Congress has used different terms to 
make it clear that corporations were not contemplated by the 
statute in question.123 That it chose not to use such terms in 
the TVPA, the district court concluded, demonstrates that Con-
gress intended that the Act could be applied against corporate 
defendants.124 
Still, the Sinaltrainal interpretation is vulnerable to criti-
cism—while it rests its holding on congressional intent, it over-
looks the fact that such intent is manifested in the Dictionary 
Act as well as the TVPA. The former statute can be seen as 
evidence that Congress intended for ―corporations‖ and ―indi-
viduals‖ to be seen as distinct creatures, since they are defined 
as two separate concepts encompassed by the word ―person.‖125 
If this is the case, the onus is not on Congress to establish that 
corporations should be excluded from the term ―individual‖; ra-
ther, the onus is on outside parties to establish that the terms 
should be synonymous.126 Although it might be considered ―un-
just‖ to find that corporations are not liable under the TVPA, 
such a reading is not necessarily ―absurd‖;127 Congress may 
have had good reasons for excluding corporations from liabili-
ty.128 Therefore, the presumption against equating the terms 
―individual‖ and ―corporation‖ has not necessarily been dis-
posed of. 
On the other hand, is this presumption accurate? The Dic-
tionary Act does not expressly state that the terms covered by 
the word ―person‖ are all distinct entities. Indeed, several of the 
entities cited in that definition are plainly understood to be in-
terchangeable in everyday language. For example, a ―firm‖ can 
also be a partnership or a company,129 while a ―partnership‖ 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1693(a)(5) (2006) (defining ―consumer‖ as ―a nat-
ural person‖ (emphasis added)); 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2006) (defining ―murder‖ 
as ―unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought‖ (emphasis 
added)). 
 124. See Sinaltrainal, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1359. 
 125. See Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 126. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010) (not-
ing the ―presumption of the Dictionary Act‖ that the terms have different 
meanings). 
 127. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 128. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the TVPA‘s legislative history). 
 129. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER‘S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 472 (11th ed. 
2003) (defining ―firm‖ as ―the name or title under which a company transacts 
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can also include companies or associations.130 The definition of 
the word ―person‖ in the Dictionary Act might reasonably be 
understood as a ―liberal approach‖ that includes a nonexhaus-
tive list of terms so as to include all relevant entities,131 rather 
than as a means to distinguish certain types of entities from 
each other, such as ―corporations‖ and ―individuals.‖ An under-
standing that the word ―individuals‖ may also refer to ―corpora-
tions,‖ therefore, is not necessarily precluded by the language 
of the Dictionary Act. 
In fact, even the common legal understanding of the term 
―individual‖ includes both natural persons as well as nonnatur-
al persons. The district court in Beanal132 relies on the sixth 
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, which specifies that ―indi-
vidual‖ means ―a single person as distinguished from a group or 
class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as 
distinguished from a . . . corporation . . . .‖133 However, the 
same definition goes on to note that the word ―may, in proper 
cases, include artificial persons.‖134 Because policy concerns 
here weigh in favor of understanding the word to include corpo-
rations,135 this language suffices to show that the broad defini-
tion of ―individual‖ is not contrary to a common legal under-
standing of the term. Additionally, it is worth noting that the 
modern edition of Black’s Law Dictionary abandons both the 
distinctions and the clarification present in the sixth edition, 
instead limiting the definition to either ―[e]xisting as an indi-
visible entity‖ or ―a single person or thing, as opposed to a 
group.‖136 Thus, a definition of ―individual‖ that includes corpo-
rations is consistent with the second definition (as a single enti-
ty) and is thereby acceptable when used to interpret statutes. 
 
business‖ or ―a partnership . . . that is not recognized as a legal person distinct 
from the members composing it‖). 
 130. See id. at 904 (defining ―partnership‖ as ―a legal relation existing be-
tween two or more persons contractually associated as joint principals in a 
business‖). 
 131. Michael Gerardi, The “Person” at Federal Law: A Framework and a 
RICO Test Suite, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2239, 2251–52, 2252 n.56 (2009) 
(noting the ―open-ended‖ nature of the definition). 
 132. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 382 (E.D. La. 
1997), aff ’d, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 133. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 773 (6th ed. 1996), cited in Jove Eng‘g, Inc. 
v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539, 1551 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 134. Id.  
 135. See infra Part II.B. 
 136. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 843 (9th ed. 2009). 
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Still, whether or not a presumption exists against finding 
the two terms to be synonymous, critics of finding corporations 
liable under the TVPA argue that the way in which the term 
―individual‖ is used in the Act precludes such a finding. As the 
Ninth Circuit concluded in Bowoto,  
The TVPA consistently uses ―individual‖ throughout the statute to re-
fer both to the torturer and the victim of torture. Corporations, of 
course, cannot be tortured. Plaintiffs ask us to give the same word dif-
ferent meanings in the same statute. They ask us to interpret ―indi-
vidual‖ to mean a natural person when referring to the victim, but to 
mean either a natural person or a corporation when referring to the 
torturer. This interpretation of the statute runs counter to the ―nor-
mal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in differ-
ent parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.‖137 
Although this logic is persuasive, it is not unassailable. 
The presumption that identical words must have the same 
strict meaning throughout a statute ―‗is not rigid,‘ and ‗the 
meaning [of the same words] well may vary to meet the pur-
poses of the law.‘‖138 After all, ―[m]ost words have different 
shades of meaning and consequently may be variously con-
strued, not only when they occur in different statutes, but when 
used more than once in the same statute or even in the same 
section.‖139 Indeed, as human rights legal scholars have pointed 
out, ―The United States Code is replete with examples of the 
use of different subsets of a term‘s full meaning in the same 
statute.‖140 For example, one statute concerned with water pol-
lution subjects ―[a]ny person who knowingly violates‖ several 
related statutes to criminal liability if that person ―knows at 
that time that he thereby places another person in imminent 
danger of death or serious bodily injury.‖141 Although the 
second use of the word person is clearly only limited to natural 
 
 137. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Comm‘r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996)) (internal citations omitted). 
 138. United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 213 
(2001) (quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 
(1932)).  
 139. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007) 
(quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, 286 U.S. at 433)). 
 140. See Brief for University of Minnesota Law School International Hu-
man Rights Clinic and Legal Scholars Michael Avery et al., as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellants, at 4, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (Nos. 09-7125, 09-7127, 09-7134, 09-7135).  
 141. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A) (2006) (emphasis added); see also 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1324 (2006) (subjecting ―[a]ny person who—knowing that a person is an 
alien, brings or attempts to bring to the United States in any manner what-
soever such person‖ through prohibited means to liability (emphasis added)). 
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persons, since only natural persons can experience ―death or 
serious bodily injury,‖ the first use of the term encompasses 
corporations as well as natural persons.142 Therefore, the fact 
that a term is used twice in an act does not mean that it must 
have the same meaning throughout the act. 
Ultimately, the ―plain language‖ of the TVPA remains 
muddled. There may or may not be a presumption that ―indi-
viduals‖ and ―corporations‖ are two separate entities. If that 
presumption exists, it may or may not have been overcome by 
clear congressional intent; if the presumption does not exist, 
the multiple uses of the word ―individual‖ may or may not prec-
lude corporate liability. The persistence of these ambiguities 
implies that reference to the statutory language alone is not 
sufficient for divining congressional intent. 
2. Legislative History 
When the plain text of a statute is ―inescapably ambi-
guous,‖ legislative history may be consulted to ascertain con-
gressional intent.143 The TVPA is accompanied by committee 
reports from each congressional chamber, several floor speech-
es by the Act‘s sponsors, and even some reports from earlier 
Congresses. Unfortunately, none of the legislative materials ac-
companying the adopted version of the TVPA actually discusses 
the issue of corporate liability, and the one document that does 
discuss it hails from four years (and two Congresses) earlier. In 
short, the legislative history is as unclear on the issue of corpo-
rate liability under the TVPA as the statutory language itself. 
Each chamber in the 102nd Congress gives the same rea-
son for choosing the language found in the TVPA. As previously 
noted, the Senate‘s accompanying report explains that the term 
―individual‖ was used ―to make crystal clear that foreign states 
or their entities cannot be sued under this bill under any cir-
cumstances.‖144 The Congressional Record indicates that the 
possibility of such interference in foreign affairs was of special 
concern to the Senate, which had in previous years failed to 
pass similar legislation that used the term ―person‖ instead of 
―individual.‖145 Similarly, the House Report from that Congress 
 
 142. See § 1319(c)(3)(A) (subjecting ―[a] person which is an organization‖ to 
criminal liability). 
 143. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 
(1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 144. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 145. See 137 CONG. REC. 2671 (1991) (statement by Sen. Arlen Specter). 
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states that ―[o]nly ‗individuals,‘ not foreign states, can be sued 
under the bill,‖146 implying that the later body gave fresh con-
sideration to the language in its legislation. It is entirely possi-
ble, therefore, that the 102nd House chose to use the word ―in-
dividual‖ for completely different reasons than did the 100th 
House. Further, as the 102nd Senate‘s accompanying report 
gives a completely different explanation for choosing the term, 
there is no indication that the 100th House‘s reasoning played 
any role in the 102nd Senate‘s choice of language. Although the 
earlier committee‘s rationale may hint at the reason for choosing 
―individual‖ over ―person‖ when describing liable parties, that 
hint is by no means dispositive and may indeed be irrelevant. 
Finally, as even the Beanal opinion notes, the legislative 
history accompanying the 102nd Congress‘s legislation does not 
expressly note an intention to exclude corporations from liabili-
ty.147 In fact, the issue of corporate liability was never explicitly 
addressed in any of the legislative history accompanying the 
version of the TVPA that was eventually passed. Courts have 
alternately considered this omission to be either of great impor-
tance or of no importance at all.148 Such a wide range of reac-
tions indicates that the omission is as ambiguous as the statu-
tory language itself. 
In summary, the relevant legislative history does not 
squarely address the question of corporate liability under the 
TVPA. Earlier legislative materials hint that the TVPA‘s word-
ing was chosen to exclude corporations from such liability, but 
the relevance of those materials is unclear, and later materials 
indicate that the language in question was adopted for alto-
gether different reasons. Just as the statutory language alone 
gives no real guidance on the issue of corporate liability, the 
legislative history similarly does little to resolve the issue. 
Without further clarification, the statute remains a tabula ra-
sa, ready for any court to read its biases into the question. 
 
 146. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4 (1991). 
 147. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348–50 (S.D. 
Fla. 2003) (citing Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 382 
(E.D. La. 1997)). 
 148. Compare, e.g., id. at 1358–59 (determining that corporations can be 
held liable under the TVPA on grounds that the legislative history does not 
exempt private corporations, with Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 382 (determining 
that the TVPA‘s plain language precludes corporate liability), aff ’d on other 
grounds, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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B. PUBLIC POLICY INTERESTS 
The ambiguous nature of the statutory language and legis-
lative history is especially disappointing considering the public 
policy concerns that weigh heavily in favor of holding corpora-
tions liable for human rights abuses under the TVPA. ―Several 
dozen‖ actions involving allegations of human rights abuses by 
corporations have been filed in recent years,149 suggesting that 
corporate involvement with such abuses is not uncommon and 
that Congress‘s intent to eliminate torture and extrajudicial 
killings would be best preserved if the TVPA were understood 
to encompass corporate liability. Evolving understandings of 
liability under the ATS, and of corporate rights and responsibil-
ities, provide additional support for preserving a remedy for 
victims of corporate torturers under the TVPA. Finally, the 
preservation of corporate liability under this Act would avoid the 
unintentional elimination of liability for a host of other juridical 
entities. This Section considers each of these concerns in turn. 
1. Corporate Liability Under the TVPA Would Support 
Congressional Intent 
An interpretation that includes corporate liability under 
the TVPA is consistent with congressional intent, which seeks 
to provide tort remedies for those who suffer human rights 
abuses. As the legislative history accompanying the TVPA ex-
plains, Congress had several interrelated goals when passing 
the Act. First, the TVPA exists to provide ―enforcement meas-
ures‖ to address ―human rights violations‖ like torture and 
extrajudicial killings.150 Second, the legislation was designed to 
meet the nation‘s requirement under international law, includ-
ing the Convention Against Torture ―to adopt measures to en-
sure that torturers are held legally accountable for their 
acts.‖151 Third, the TVPA was designed ―to provide means of 
civil redress to victims of torture‖ in case the victims‘ home na-
tions did not feature a functioning or effective judiciary, as 
―[t]he general collapse of democratic institutions [is] characte-
ristic of countries scourged by massive violations of fundamen-
tal rights . . . .‖152 Fourth, the legislation was designed to ―ex-
tend a civil remedy also to U.S. citizens who may have been 
 
 149. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 32, at 312. 
 150. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 3. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. 
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tortured abroad,‖ as the ATS ―provides a remedy to aliens on-
ly.‖153 Finally, the TVPA was ―intended to deny torturers a safe 
haven‖ in the United States, as a suit can only be pursued if 
the federal government has personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant.154 
Treating corporate wrongdoers as liable under the TVPA 
supports each of these goals. By allowing civil suits against any 
entity, whether a natural or a nonnatural person, who engages 
in torture or extrajudicial killing, the TVPA provides appropri-
ate enforcement measures to meet the nation‘s international 
law obligations to hold such actors accountable. Doing so also 
promotes the rule of law by discouraging corporate entities 
from taking advantage of a nation‘s failing legal infrastructure 
by engaging in brutal human rights violations in the further-
ance of business goals.155 Finally, a rule allowing corporate lia-
bility provides strong incentives for American corporations to 
monitor their foreign subsidiaries in order to make sure that 
these entities are not responsible for torture or extrajudicial 
killings in other countries,156 as a failure to do so subjects the 
corporations to personal jurisdiction under the TVPA.157 Far 
from contravening Congress‘s express and implied intent, a 
recognition of corporate liability for torture and other human 
rights abuses under the TVPA would fully support the goals of 
the 102nd Congress upon passage of that Act. 
2. Corporate Liability Under the TVPA Would Allow That 
Statute to Serve as an Alternative to the ATS 
With the viability of ATS actions against corporations very 
much in question, the TVPA remains necessary as an alterna-
tive means of redress for victims of human rights abuses. In 
discussing the relationship between the TVPA and the ATS, 
the legislative record demonstrates Congress‘s intention that 
 
 153. See id. at 4.  
 154. 138 CONG. REC. 4176 (1992) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter). 
 155. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D.C. 
2005) (noting allegations that an oil company contracted with the Indonesian 
military to suppress a rebellion that interfered with the defendant‘s pipeline), 
rev’d in part, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 156. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 365–66 
(E.D. La. 1997) (describing allegations that an American mining company‘s 
subsidiary engaged in human rights violations in Indonesia), aff ’d on other 
grounds, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).  
 157. See Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1266 
(N.D. Ala. 2003) (finding jurisdiction under the TVPA for a suit against an Al-
abama mining company for actions by the company‘s Colombian subsidiary). 
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the TVPA serve to complement, not replace, the ATS as ―a clear 
and specific remedy . . . for torture and extrajudicial killing.‖158 
In recent years, however, appellate courts have begun to se-
verely constrain the applicability of the ATS. Although tort ac-
tions against aliens for claims of torture or extrajudicial killing 
once served as the most common basis for an ATS claim,159 a 
circuit split now exists as to whether such actions can go for-
ward in light of the passage of the TVPA.160 Additionally, 
though actions against corporations for human rights violations 
have dominated ATS litigation for well over a decade,161 the 
Second Circuit‘s decision in Kiobel has created another circuit 
split that threatens to close off that avenue for redress as well.162 
Corporate liability under the TVPA provides an alternative 
mechanism for redressing these wrongs when they are also 
committed in violation of the ATS, a necessary safeguard in ju-
risdictions that bar actions for torture163 or torts against corpo-
rate defendants164 under the latter statute. If the Supreme 
Court ultimately agrees with the Second Circuit‘s conclusion 
that the law of nations does not provide for an action against 
corporations, the availability of a remedy under the TVPA 
would prove vital to protect citizens of the world against dead-
ly, unscrupulous business practices. Similarly, if the Supreme 
Court were to agree with the Seventh Circuit‘s holding that the 
TVPA provides the only channel for litigation against those en-
gaging in torture or extrajudicial killing, the effectiveness of 
the latter Act would be severely diminished if an entire class of 
potential defendants proved immune to the sole remaining civil 
action that can be brought against them for human rights 
abuses. Without the protection against corporate and state-
 
 158. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 3 (1991). 
 159. See Duruigbo, supra note 43. (―For some time, use of the ATS re-
mained limited to cases involving agents of the state who abused the power of 
government to oppress their people, often with impunity.‖). 
 160. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat‘l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 
2007).  
 161. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 32, at 312. 
 162. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 
2010) (holding that the ATS does not allow for actions against corporations), 
cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491); Ku, supra 
note 54 (celebrating the potential demise of corporate liability under the ATS). 
 163. See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 884–86 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 164. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 148–49. But see supra note 106 regarding the pos-
sibility that an absence of corporate liability under the ATS may preclude 
some claims against corporations under the TVPA, regardless of a holding that 
the term ―individuals‖ as used in the TVPA can include corporations. 
 2011] TORTURED LANGUAGE 701 
 
sponsored abuses currently recognized by some jurisdictions 
under the TVPA, the arrival of either or both alternative out-
come would spell the end of redress options against some of the 
world‘s most notorious abusers. 
3. Corporate Liability Under the TVPA Would Encourage 
Corporate Responsibility in an Age of Corporate Rights 
Corporate rights appear to have been expanding quickly in 
the past few decades, and the TVPA provides one mechanism 
for ensuring that corporate responsibilities remain equally in 
focus. The concept of corporate personhood has been recognized 
in federal courts since as early as 1886, when the Supreme 
Court pronounced that such entities had the same Fourteenth 
Amendment rights as natural persons.165 Within ten years of 
that opinion, the Court had developed enough caselaw support-
ing the proposition that the Equal Protection and Due Process 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment protected corporations 
as well as natural persons that the matter was considered ―set-
tled.‖166 In the past few decades, these protections have been 
further recognized as imbuing corporations with virtually the 
same speech rights as natural persons,167 culminating in the 
recent Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision 
extending political speech protections to corporate entities.168 
With the trend line established, some observers are concerned 
that these cases ―have created a political atmosphere in which 
corporations can wield their financial power while the interests 
of the people has [sic] been relegated to the sidelines.‖169 
To preserve general principles of fairness as well as the in-
terests of such natural persons, the constitutional rights of cor-
porations should be complemented by an understanding that 
 
 165. See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). At 
least one authority has questioned the precedential grounds of this holding on 
the basis that the statement regarding corporate personhood appears ―in the 
portion of the case before the actual opinion begins.‖ See Dale Rubin, Corpo-
rate Personhood: How the Courts Have Employed Bogus Jurisprudence to 
Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28 QUIN-
NIPIAC L. REV. 523, 554–55 (2010). 
 166. Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 
(1896) (citing Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R.R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386, 
391 (1892); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 29 
(1889); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 
U.S. 181, 189 (1888); Santa Clara Cnty., 118 U.S. at 396). 
 167. See First Nat‘l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978). 
 168. 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). 
 169. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 165, at 584. 
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such entities also share the same responsibilities as noncorpo-
rate persons. For purposes of the TVPA, this translates into 
pairing the protections of the United States against foreign in-
jury with the responsibility to avoid engaging in injurious be-
havior in a foreign jurisdiction. Confirmation that corporations 
are assigned both the same protections and the same responsi-
bilities as natural persons would be consistent with the grow-
ing number of authorities that recognize the equivalent per-
sonhood of both types of entity.170 Further, this recognition 
could go far in dispelling some of the bitterness felt towards 
corporate entities in the wake of Citizens United.171 From that 
perspective, responsible corporate entities and subsidiaries 
would have nothing to fear and everything to gain from such a 
move, as it would highlight the entities‘ voluntary acceptance of 
accountability in a world that continues to apply further rights 
and protections to such actors. 
4. Recognizing Liability for Nonnatural Persons Under the 
TVPA Would Further Avoid Unintended Consequences 
If the plain language of the TVPA forecloses action against 
any entity but a natural person, might victims who have ac-
tually suffered at the hands of such natural persons nonethe-
less fail to recover damages? As a concurring judge in the 
Second Circuit‘s Kiobel decision noted, estates and trusts are 
just as much ―juridical entities‖ (as opposed to natural persons) 
as corporations.172 On that basis, the judge warned, a holding 
that the law of nations does not allow for suits against corpora-
tions under the ATS might have the unforeseen consequence of 
prohibiting such suits against the estates of wrongdoers re-
sponsible for torture or extrajudicial killings.173 Had that prin-
ciple existed in the mid-1990s, a notable ATS case involving a 
successful $2 billion suit against the estate of the former Presi-
 
 170. See Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (defining ―person‖ as used in 
statutes to include both ―corporations‖ and ―individuals‖ by default, without 
regard to whether the statute imposes protection or liability); Clinton v. City of 
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 & n.13 (1998) (holding that the term ―individual‖ 
can be synonymous with ―person‖ and can therefore refer to corporate entities). 
 171. See, e.g., Robert L. Kerr, Naturalizing the Artificial Citizen: Repeating 
Lochner’s Error in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 15 COMM. 
L. & POL‘Y 311 (2010) (comparing Citizens United to the infamous substantive 
due process case).  
 172. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 161 n.12 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring only in the judgment), cert. granted, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491). 
 173. See id. 
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dent of the Philippines might never have survived pretrial mo-
tions, and the President‘s victims would have never recovered 
damages for their suffering.174 
Unlike the ATS, the TVPA relies on statutory language to 
determine who qualifies as a claimant and a defendant. Still, a 
strict reading of wording that purportedly distinguishes be-
tween ―individuals‖ and other juridical entities175 might lead to 
a similar outcome for victims seeking redress under the TVPA 
from the estates or trusts of their tormentors. Indeed, in grant-
ing certiorari in Mohamad, the Court indicated that it would 
consider the question as to whether the TVPA ―permits actions 
against defendants which are not natural persons,‖ a broader 
question than one limited to the responsibility of corporate ent-
ities under the Act.176 The fact that a victim‘s torturer may be 
able to escape liability through death does nothing to help the 
victim recover and rebuild her life following human rights 
abuses. Recognition of corporate liability under the TVPA, via 
either judicial interpretation or statutory modification, may 
prove integral in preserving this avenue of litigation for victims 
of torture. 
In summary, the plain language of the TVPA and its ac-
companying legislative history are unclear on the question of 
corporate liability under the Act. However, the United States 
has strong policy interests in holding corporations liable for tor-
ture or extrajudicial killings that they have committed under 
the color of foreign law. With these interests in mind, the fol-
lowing Part discusses potential solutions that would resolve the 
ambiguities of the TVPA while continuing to address the 
scourge of corporate-sponsored torture. 
III.  PRESERVING CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE 
TVPA: SOLUTIONS   
Although the language of the TVPA is unclear, the Su-
preme Court should recognize the liability of nonnatural per-
sons under the TVPA when it considers the question. While leg-
islative modification of the Act‘s language might also be 
appropriate, such efforts may not be necessary if the Supreme 
Court reaches a decision that is both supported by recent Court 
holdings and consistent with Congress‘s anti-torture intentions. 
 
 174. See id. (citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776–77 (9th 
Cir. 1996)). 
 175. See 1 U.S.C. § 1. 
 176. See 11-88 Mohamad v. Rajoub, supra note 27. 
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Additionally, the potential changes to the TVPA‘s language 
might be less likely to pass congressional muster in the modern 
political climate. This Part therefore begins with an examina-
tion of how the Supreme Court can resolve these concerns, then 
moves to a brief review of the problems associated with pur-
suing legislative remedies. 
A. SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
A Supreme Court decision holding that corporations and 
other nonnatural persons are liable under the TVPA would be 
consistent with reasonable interpretations of the Act‘s language 
and would support Congress‘s efforts to eliminate torture and 
extrajudicial killings. First, such a decision would appropriate-
ly signal that the text of the Act contemplates corporate liabili-
ty, a development that would be welcome in light of the dispa-
rate rational interpretations of the TVPA‘s language.177 A 
flexible understanding of the term ―individual‖ to encompass 
both natural and nonnatural persons in this context, even 
when used in two distinct segments of an act, would be consis-
tent with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.178 Thus, the 
Supreme Court would be clarifying the appropriate boundaries 
for the nonstandard use of ―individual‖ while signaling that 
corporate liability remains feasible under the TVPA.  
Second, a Court holding recognizing corporate liability un-
der the TVPA would support Congress‘s original policy goals.179 
Because so much alleged torture is purportedly committed by 
corporate actors,180 a TVPA that unmistakably provides for tort 
actions against such entities would reduce human rights 
abuses by imposing liability against some of the most egregious 
abusers, thereby meeting our nation‘s international obligations 
to eliminate torture.181 Further, because such abuses would be 
reduced, persons of any nationality would be better protected 
 
 177. See supra Part II.A.1 for a discussion of the inconsistent interpreta-
tions and applications of the TVPA.  
 178. See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 
213 (2001) (noting that ―‗the meaning [of the same words] well may vary to 
meet the purposes of the law‘‖ (quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United 
States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)) (alteration in original)); Clinton v. City of 
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 & n.13 (1998) (holding that the term ―individual‖ 
can be synonymous with ―person‖ and can therefore refer to corporate entities). 
 179. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 180. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 32, at 312 (noting that ―several doz-
en‖ such cases have been filed since 2001). 
 181. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 56, at 85. 
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against torture and extrajudicial killings; in particular, citizens 
of failing states could continue to seek justice for such abuses in 
U.S. courts where their existing judicial system may otherwise 
falter.182 Finally, such a holding would signal to potential viola-
tors that the United States does not tolerate human rights 
abuses within its borders.183 Corporations would recognize that 
in order to do business in this country while escaping tort lia-
bility under this Act, torture and extrajudicial killings would 
not be available to them as a means for resolving labor dis-
putes. Even if the text and legislative history associated with 
the TVPA are not models of clarity, the Court‘s recognition of 
corporate liability would preserve congressional intent while 
resolving any questions about the literal meaning of the text.184  
Third, such a holding would clarify that the TVPA‘s lan-
guage does not foreclose suits against other nonnatural per-
sons, such as the estates of deceased natural persons who en-
gage in torture or extrajudicial killings.185 A Court holding that 
recognizes the inclusion of juridical entities in the TVPA‘s use 
of the term ―individual‖ would have the added benefit of allow-
ing tortured persons or their survivors to seek recompense from 
the estates and/or trusts of persons responsible for such abuses. 
Congress‘s stated intention to provide redress for victims of tor-
ture is not effectively met if these victims cannot be compen-
sated for the wrongs suffered at a torturer‘s hands merely be-
cause that torturer has died.186 Although this rationale is only 
tangentially related to the issue of corporate liability for torture 
and extrajudicial killings, such recognition nonetheless ad-
vances Congress‘s goals with the TVPA. 
Fourth, a favorable decision in Mohamad would eliminate 
the need to otherwise pass legislation that could be politically 
unpalatable. In the last decade, the United States government 
has shown an increased willingness to tolerate actions that 
would have previously been condemned as torture if committed 
by other actors.187 From this perspective, congressional action 
 
 182. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(b) (2006). 
 183. But cf. DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY 500–12 (2007) (not-
ing the growing acceptance of torture in American government and policy cir-
cles in the early 21st century). 
 184. See § 1350 note § 2. 
 185. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 186. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 187. See, e.g., REJALI, supra note 183; Glenn Greenwald, The Inhumane 
Conditions of Bradley Manning’s Detention, SALON (Dec. 15, 2010, 1:15 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2010/12/15/manning_3/ (describing the alleged mi-
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to reduce the prevalence of such abuses would possibly not be a 
priority, and indeed might be condemned for political purpos-
es.188 Needless to say, the Supreme Court need not consider 
such modern political concerns when seeking to uphold Con-
gress‘s original intentions associated with the passage of the 
TVPA. 
In addition to the foregoing factors, a Supreme Court deci-
sion recognizing corporate liability under the TVPA would have 
other benefits weighing in its favor. First, considering that 
precedent demonstrates the Court‘s recognition that corporate 
personhood entails both rights189 and responsibilities,190 it 
would be appropriate for the Court to find that such liability 
exists. As with any Court review, there is also the alluring 
prospect of finality—unless Congress did decide to respond by 
passing legislation to the contrary, the Court‘s holding would 
be the last word on the interpretation of the Act‘s language. On 
that note, finally, any adverse Court decision on corporate per-
sonality under the TVPA can potentially be addressed through 
legislative means.191 
This is not to say that the Court is guaranteed to recognize 
corporate liability under the TVPA. Considering the ambiguity 
of the Act‘s language, which opens it up to multiple valid inter-
pretations,192 a court that is disinclined to extend liability to 
corporations under the Act would have sufficient precedent to 
justify this decision.193 On the other hand, three of the justices 
currently sitting on the Court ruled with the majority in Clin-
 
streatment of a U.S. Army Private accused of leaking classified documents to 
WikiLeaks). 
 188.  Cf. Tweet from Congressman Steve King, Wonder What President 
Obama Thinks of Water Boarding Now?, TWITTER (May 2, 2011, 8:06 AM), 
https://twitter.com/#!/SteveKingIA/status/65039561755066369 (mocking Pres-
ident Obama‘s opposition to torture following the killing of Osama bin Laden). 
 189. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 
(2010) (prohibiting suppression of ―political speech on the basis of the speak-
er‘s corporate identity‖). 
 190. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428–429, 428 n.13 
(1998) (holding that the term ―individual‖ can be synonymous with ―person‖ 
and can therefore refer to corporate entities). 
 191. See infra Part III.B. 
 192. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 193. See Comm‘r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996) (citing ―the normal 
rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of 
the same act are intended to have the same meaning‖ (internal citation omit-
ted)), quoted in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(noting that both the torturer and the victim of torture are referred to as ―in-
dividual[s]‖ in the TVPA). 
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ton,194 which relied in part on the proposition that the terms 
―individual‖ and ―person‖ are synonymous in certain appropri-
ate contexts; only one currently sitting justice explicitly op-
posed this language.195 Similarly, four current justices joined 
the majority in 2001 when the Court reaffirmed that ―the 
meaning [of the same words] well may vary to meet the pur-
poses of the law‖;196 only one current justice did not agree with 
this proposition.197 The fact that a significant number of justic-
es have shown flexibility when interpreting the use of similar 
terms based on the purpose of the law bodes well for those who 
believe the Act contemplates corporate liability. 
Ultimately, although the unclear language of the statute 
means that no outcome is guaranteed, the textual and policy 
justifications for a finding of corporate liability under the TVPA 
should suffice to convince the Court to adopt such a position. 
However, in the event that the Court holds to the contrary, 
other means for preserving corporate liability under the TVPA 
are available. 
B. LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATION OF THE TVPA 
Depending on the Supreme Court‘s holding in Mohamad 
during the October 2011 Term, legislative modification of the 
TVPA may be required to address the ambiguity of the statute‘s 
text while ensuring a cause of action for victims of human 
rights abuses at the hands of corporate actors. Although sever-
al possible changes to the TVPA‘s language could be pursued, 
the easiest and least disruptive approach would be to alter the 
portion allocating liability so that it covers ―any person‖ rather 
than ―an individual.‖ Under this proposal, the modified version 
of the TVPA would read as follows:  
Liability.—Any person who, under actual or apparent authority, or 
color of law, of any foreign nation—(1) subjects an individual to tor-
 
 194. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 420–49 (majority opinion joined by Justices 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg). 
 195. See id. at 453–55 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Although Justice Breyer joined part of Justice Scalia‘s opinion, he did 
not join the part that criticizes this language in particular, and his dissent 
rested on different grounds. See id. at 470–97 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 196. See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 
213 (2001) (majority opinion by Justice Ginsburg joined by Justices Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Breyer, as well as four others) (citing Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. 
v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)). 
 197. See id. at 220 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (refusing to 
agree with the Court‘s decision to ―assign[ ] the identical language a different 
meaning . . . .‖). 
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ture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or 
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil ac-
tion, be liable for damages to the individual‘s legal representative, or 
to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful 
death.198 
Because the United States Code defines the term ―person‖ 
to include more than just natural persons in most cases,199 such 
revision would embrace liability for both natural and nonna-
tural persons, including corporations. 
This alteration would improve the statute in several ways. 
Most of the major benefits of a favorable Supreme Court hold-
ing—clarification of the statute, preservation of congressional 
intent, and recognition of liability for various juridical enti-
ties200—would similarly emerge if the TVPA‘s language were 
modified in this manner. In particular, a legislative effort to re-
place ―individual‖ with ―person‖ when describing the liable ac-
tor would leave virtually no room for confusion regarding the 
applicability of the TVPA to corporate wrongdoers. 
Two alternative revisions could also have the same or simi-
lar impact on the question of corporate liability, though each 
presents its own problems. First, Congress could change all in-
stances of the word ―individual‖ to ―person,‖ perhaps with the 
caveat that no foreign state or entity could be liable. Under this 
option, both the victim and the potential defendant would fall 
under the term ―person,‖ thus opening up the definition to any 
of the entities described in the Dictionary Act definition of the 
term.201 While this move would eliminate the unhelpful speci-
ficity of ―individual‖ as it is currently used in the statute, this 
sort of alteration would leave the statute vulnerable to the at-
tack that the use of identical words ―in different parts of the 
same act [implies] the same meaning‖ in both cases.202 Because 
―[c]orporations, of course, cannot be tortured,‖203 the broader 
meaning of ―person‖ would likely be narrowed to refer to natu-
ral persons so that the term could plausibly mean the same 
thing in both instances. Because this solution perpetuates the 
 
 198. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a) (2006). 
 199. See Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 200. See supra Part III.A. 
 201. Cf. § 1350 note § 2(a) (showing that an ―individual‖ can both torture 
someone and be subject to torture). 
 202. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Comm‘r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996)). 
 203. Id. (quoting United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 
2000)).  
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problem rather than resolving it, Congress would have little in-
centive to pursue it. 
A second alternative would be to add the phrase ―or corpo-
rate entity‖ after the word ―individual‖ in the provision discuss-
ing potential defendants, leaving ―[a]ny individual or corporate 
entity‖ liable under the Act. This option would make it clear 
that corporations in particular could be liable for torture in-
flicted on individuals. Although this solution most clearly ad-
dresses the problem by expressly specifying the existence of 
corporate liability, it also would stand only a minimal chance of 
passing—Congress is unlikely to specifically target corporate 
entities without having some strong political capital or motiva-
tion to allow such a move. Further, this alteration does nothing 
to address the concerns of those who would seek redress from 
other juridical entities, such as the estates of deceased tortur-
ers. These issues can best be avoided by adopting the more 
modest approach of changing the word ―individual‖ to ―person‖ 
when describing the liable actor. 
Of course, even if this suggested change to the TVPA‘s text 
were pursued, passage of such a statutory revision is by no 
means guaranteed. As noted earlier, the current Congress may 
not see the elimination of torture and extrajudicial killings as a 
priority.204 Although the TVPA reflects the will of Congress 
that such human rights violations be eliminated, this does not 
mean that the current Congress shares the 102nd Congress‘s 
sense of urgency on the matter. Unless an unfavorable Su-
preme Court decision somehow compels Congress to take ac-
tion, the motivation to act may not be present. 
That said, legislative modification of the TVPA remains a 
viable option if the Supreme Court does not recognize organiza-
tional liability in Mohamad. Such legislation, if necessary, 
would meet all of Congress‘s stated policy goals and uphold the 
nation‘s international treaty obligations while requiring little 
more than the changing of a single word. Because such a simple 
change could have such a significant impact, those who believe 
that corporations should be held liable for human rights abuses 
should be prepared to pursue the legislative-modification op-
tion in the event that the Supreme Court fails to recognize 
nonnatural persons as liable under the TVPA. 
 
 204. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
The intertwined history of the ATS and the TVPA demon-
strates the congressional desire that some forum or fora exist 
for the litigation of civil actions brought against any entity that 
engages in torture or extrajudicial killings. However, the ambi-
guities in the existing text of the TVPA have allowed courts to 
create a circuit split that threatens to eliminate any and all 
avenues for recovering damages from corporate wrongdoers. 
Because this foreclosure of remedies would be contrary to con-
gressional purpose and public policy, the Supreme Court should 
recognize that nonnatural persons are liable under the TVPA 
when it considers the question in the October 2011 Term. Al-
ternatively, proponents of corporate liability for human rights 
abuses should pursue legislative action to clearly codify such 
liability under the Act. Regardless, in an era where corpora-
tions are operating virtually unfettered, the focus on prevent-
ing such actors from engaging in the worst forms of human 
rights abuses should be renewed. Only then can we truly say 
that the United States is doing everything within its power to 
live up to its international obligations, provide appropriate 
forms of redress for the most horrendous abuses, and expand 
the rule of law and respect for human rights across the globe. 
